How to Spot Disinformation: A Practical Example

So last night, the following post appeared on Israeli Telegram, which quoted a Syrian channel. They took the bait because they seemed unable to catch it.

This is good disinformation and an excellent piece to explain how this works. The only difference may be the language because Russians do the same. They tend to be far more, ahem, wordy, though. It’s one of the best examples I have seen over the last two-plus years. And since it’s short, it makes it even better. So first, the post:

A massive military convoy of the US Army entered from northern Iraq towards Syria.

The convoy consists of 63 trucks loaded with military equipment, logistics supplies and MIM-23 Hawk air defense systems.

The convoy dispersed in northeastern Syria.

So first, why does it work? Would we reinforce units all across the Syrian front? Yes, yes, we would. Do we want to add extra supplies to forward operating bases (FOB) as the situation becomes incredibly tense?

We would be stupid not to. It’s malpractice not to do it. So, on the surface, this sounds very plausible. It also matches our practice of reinforcing our FOBs via Iraq.

How do I know this is possibly a fine piece of disinformation? And to be fair, it could be misidentified equipment…